

## Introductory Editorial

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A friend, former mentor and colleague at Roskilde University (where he became Emeritus professor of economics), Bruno Amoroso, a kind and generous editorial board member of this e-journal, died January 20 2017. It was very sad.

Bruno Amoroso was a formidable dissenting and kind voice, with a natural propensity to question, and his life was an incessant proliferation of projects, ideas and practice of liberation. He was convinced that we must take action to change conventional habits and methods of understanding the world, and this requires increasing awareness and thus critical thought, of which he was a champion. Those who knew Bruno Amoroso well know his unconventional look at the world around us, his ability and patience to persist in a repulsion for dogmas, his attitude to friendship and conversations. We should wish that kind of unquenchable curiosity for the world around us on anyone.

Our tribute to Bruno takes the form of a memorial written by one of Bruno Amoroso's colleagues and dear friends: Jesper Jespersen, professor of economics at the Department of Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University, where he has been teaching and conducting research since 1996.

This Vol. 2016 (1) issue is devoted to "Migration and its surroundings".

In general, there are various and intertwined short-term and long-term determinants of migration: response to economic conditions and perspectives, mass poverty, violence and war, political risks, population pressure, climate change and other factors.

Economic development in countries of origin influence the extent and patterns of migration, as well as admission criteria of host countries. Human mobility depends on migrant characteristics and on policies of both host and sending countries (labor and credit markets, job opportunities, welfare system, systems of immigrants' admission, civic participation and citizenship).

Therefore, the idea of clearly distinguishing between economic migrants and refugees/asylum seekers is useful for policy prescriptions, but they cannot be fully separated, particularly when the condition of refugee and displaced people becomes structural and long-term.

There is no shortage of relationships between migration and development. They are significant but at the same time complex and not conducive to generalization. Many studies on economic development have demonstrated that economic

growth tends to increase the propensity to emigrate in the short to medium-term, while only in the long-term can development result in a reduction in voluntary and forced migration (the migration hump theory). Case studies and empirical analyses demonstrate how the sign and coefficient of the relationship between migration and development may change markedly, to the point of rendering migration a fundamental driving force or, on the contrary, an insidious obstacle to development.

Outlining the fundamental points of the agenda for analysis and policy in relation to international migration, we can gain some useful insights in order to guide future reflection and choices, both in terms of objectives and policy instruments for action.

Within the limits of simplification, we can talk of one approach focussed on the link between migration and development and of a second approach which centres on the notion of managing migration flows. Skimming through the items listed in the sub-agendas contained in the two macro-areas, it becomes clear that these approaches reflect two perspectives that are important yet different.

In the first case, the interest and point of view of the countries of origin of the migration flows is emphasized and development is principally intended to refer to development of countries of origin, whose strategic objectives should be the guiding force for international cooperation policies.

In the second case, it is the viewpoint of the countries of destination of the migration flows which prevails, and their interest in creating conditions for better managing and governing migration flows, with an increasing focus on the so called securitization of migration policies: in the last decade, an increasing fear of "illegal migrants" and terrorism has made internal security the key concept to re-orient external policies.

These are two agendas which, when taken separately, appear to move in different directions, including in relation to the timeframe of reference. The migration management policy pursues short-term objectives, requiring immediate results, including because of the great difficulty involved in contemplating medium to long-term scenarios. On the other hand, development policies establish objectives fifteen to twenty years in the future, as in the case of the Sustainable Development Goals, in what is clearly a long-term outlook.

The difference in the nature, content and objectives of the two agendas translates into a different emphasis on crucial elements of the migration "market".

Today a very serious risk is represented by the weakening or curtailment of long-term development policies to the short-term humanitarian crisis of refugees and security priorities.

If one were to think that forced migration is a problem of the country of origin's own making that must be resolved in that country, or a security or humanitarian problem in a specific host country, then that is just shortsighted selfishness. International solutions are needed, and political, security, humanitarian, development and diplomatic dimensions must all be addressed. Only a

comprehensive response may represent a sustainable solution. And this implies significant investment.

Despite theoretical and practical difficulties involved in separating out “forced” from unforced migrants, many categories of forcibly displaced people co-exist, demonstrating that this phenomenon is a very wide-ranging and contains different situations:

1. Refugees according to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention,
2. Asylum seekers whose claim to refugee status is not yet definitively evaluated,
3. Stateless persons without a recognized nationality and not belonging to any country,
4. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Returnees.

Nonetheless, these categories of “forced” migrants represent just a small part of those who migrate.

The world population was estimated to have just reached 7.5 billion.

In view of the fact that there is considerable heterogeneity in the types of data collected across countries, the UN Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs estimated the number of internal migrants (migrants inside of their country of origin) as a worldwide stock of almost 800 million. Therefore, the percentage of internal migrants in the global population is over 10%.

According to the Perspectives on Global Development 2017, published by the OECD Development Centre, some 243 million people were living outside their country of birth in 2015, accounting to 3.2% of the world population.

By combining internal and international migrants, there is over a billion of migrants in the world. In other words, every seventh person in the world is a migrant.

However, with regard to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (those displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects, the percentage is much lower.

According to the UN Refugee Agency (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR), we are now witnessing 65.3 million displaced people around the world who have been forced from home. Therefore, the percentage of “forced” migrants in the global population is just 0.87%.

The majority are Internally displaced people (IDP), and among them are nearly 21.3 million refugees. There are also 10 million stateless people who have been denied a nationality and access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and freedom of movement.

Syria remains the world’s largest source country of refugees during 2015 with over 4.9 million people, followed by Afghanistan with over 2.5 million and Somalia over 1 million. Around four-fifths of the world's refugees have fled from the crisis areas into neighboring countries. Turkey is the largest refugee-hosting country worldwide, with 2.5 million refugees.

Today we witness to a dramatic increase in refugee and migrant flows across the Mediterranean. These flows are the combined result of outflows from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria due to political and security conditions, and from the Horn of Africa and Western Africa due to poverty and conflict.

From a worldwide and historical perspective, today developing countries host most of the displaced and current stock of refugees in the EU is not an unprecedented phenomenon: current total number of almost 2.4 million is just below the early-1990s peak.

As a direct consequence of these stylized facts, we can confine ourselves to addressing certain fundamental points about migration policies.

First, it is crucial to clarify that urgent focus on short-term crisis responses cannot be detached from medium-term socioeconomic dimensions of forced displacement. It is essential to define emergency solutions as well as rights-based protection agenda and sustainable development strategies. Otherwise, any solutions you may have is doomed to fail. Reception and (political, social, economic and financial) integration/inclusion policies for refugees should, therefore, be linked and mainstreamed in general, confirming that, if ever there were the boundaries between forced and unforced migration, they are surely fuzzy and blurred.

Second, interventions should help reduce—even eliminate—vulnerabilities: this implies a priority to help the most vulnerable people among the refugees, but also to support host communities who should manage the shock caused by an inflow of forcibly displaced persons. Policy solutions become sustainable and effective when we are overcoming a supposed trade-off or inevitable conflict of interests between host communities and forcibly displaced persons. If, and only if, significant political and financial investment is made in recognizing both these priorities, then the result could be a lasting solution. The objective must be a win-win solution for both host communities and forcibly displaced persons and they must be actively engaged. All the risks and negative effects on host communities (in particular, some segments of host communities) must be minimized, as well as all the potential positive opportunities for those segments of host communities must be promoted. This is not just a good omen: the development response should also aim to help reduce problems, poverty and unemployment among the hosts (that already existed), as they adjust to a transformed context.

Third, we can say that the scale and complexity of the refugees crisis affecting Europe is new, but the crisis of forced displacement is not new and we can manage it if we approach this as both a humanitarian and a development challenge (development in countries of origin, transit and destination), also because it is not a European emergency crisis in terms of numbers. The management of this crisis requires adequate effort and collective action. If someone presumes that it is a problem of a country of origin's own making that must be resolved in that country or in the partnership with specific host country

and not at regional and global level, or just as a security or humanitarian problem, then that is just shortsighted selfishness. International solutions are needed, and political, security, humanitarian, development and diplomatic dimensions must be all addressed. Only a comprehensive response may represent a sustainable solution. It is not just a security issue or a humanitarian issue. It is a comprehensive political challenge and the nexus between security-humanitarian and development dimensions must be properly addressed at political and diplomatic levels. This means complexity and this imply significant investment.

Based on such premises, the purpose of this thematic issue is to present and discuss three different disciplinary theoretical and empirical approaches to understanding migration issues that transcend the current emergency of refugees and asylum seekers in the Mediterranean region, whilst focusing on the same region.

In fact, the first two articles take stock of the general state of art and analyze the North African characteristics of the same phenomenon that is the mobility of medical doctors.

The first article by Ahmed Driouchi presents the conceptual and theoretical framework of the research on the migration of medical doctors, from an economic perspective.

The article analyzes the phenomenon of this specific type of high-skilled migration comprehensively from a variety of different angles, with a brief review of many contributions on the field. Besides those who migrate, the migration of high-skilled workers affects both sending and receiving countries and the article shows how migration of medical doctors is critical to all countries.

A combination of shortage of health-care providers and poor distribution of providers within the same country affects developing countries, with additional stratifications due to the disparities between urban and rural areas.

Shortages and imbalances of medical personal are seen as an international problem, and this shortage includes more than physicians and nurses: it includes also pharmacists, dentists, laboratory technicians, emergency medical personnel, public health specialists, health sector management, and administrative staff.

All over the world, the needs for medical doctors have been increasing through time and countries under the effects of the changes occurring in health technologies and the increasing demand for health care. The implied shortages have been growing while accounting for new niches related to the expression of the demand for health and improvements in the welfare of the populations. The shortage of medical doctors could be also related to the nature of the labor supply curve that may not respond positively to new incentives. And the deficit of medical doctors is also affecting the universal health care coverage. Therefore, a resulting competition for attracting high-skilled migrants occurs among rich countries and very serious problems are faced by the poorest countries that are not capable of attract or hold talent.

Empirical evidence on labor supply determinants as well as on the different push and pull factors leading to the emigration of medical doctors shows how migration of medical doctors involves many costs and legal barriers and could be managed by cooperative policies to generate further benefits with win-win outcomes to both Northern and Southern economies.

The second article by Mohamed Saib Musette, Hocine Abdellaoui and Ahcène Zehnati is an overview of medical doctors' migration from Maghreb through the sociology of migration lenses. An analysis of Maghrebian skilled migrants shows the significant concentration in France and Canada. To quantify this phenomenon, the authors use and cross multiple data sources: those of the Health Ministries of the three Maghreb countries, the employment survey and other sources collected in France and at international level.

An empirical evaluation of the "brain drain" rate involving particularly physicians migrating to France shows that the different specialties are not affected to the same extent by the phenomenon of medical specialists born and trained in the Maghrebian countries of origin. Psychiatry remains the specialty registering the highest migration rate, and half of Maghreb anesthesiologists practicing in France have graduated in their origin country.

The authors underline the fact that an expected decrease of remittances in the long run and that high skilled workers contribute far less to remittances than those who are less skilled. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider the theories according to which countries of origin do benefit from a deal in with the losses caused by the departure of skills are compensated by migrants' remittances. The classical sociological vision of migration as a social success for social mobility needs also to be revised.

In the third section, the authors suggest to open a new social dialogue with a multi-faceted view on migrant's integration. According to the authors, the current context calls for a revision, if not a break with past visions of integration, laying new foundations for social dialogue aimed at the prosperity of countries of both shores. In particular, three tracks are suggested to initiate a renewal of a social dialogue between the two shores of the Mediterranean on integration through migration: relationships between migration and development, harmonization of the models of governance of migration flows from Maghreb, building bridges between the shores.

The third article, by Paola Abenante, provides some insights from an anthropological and cultural studies' perspective, as shown by the title reference to cultural essentialism. This concept refers to "*a system of belief grounded in a conception of human beings as 'cultural' (and under certain conditions territorial and national) subjects, i.e., bearers of a culture, located within a bordered world, which defines them and differentiates them from others*", to cite Ralph Grillo, a relevant social anthropologist who has had a long-standing concern with transnational migration and ethnicity in Africa and Europe. The arrival of migrants and asylum seekers on the shores of the Mediterranean basin is giving rise to an increasing populist and xenophobic use of culture concept in political arena.

Culture can easily lead to essentialism by *“preset[ting] people’s individual behavior as entirely defined and constrained by the cultures in which they live so that the stereotype becomes the essence of who they are”*, as Adrian Holliday reminds us in his 20’10 volume on Intercultural Communication and Ideology.

Based on these premises, the article helps to understand the different and competing understandings of ‘proper Islamic praxis’ between Egyptian Muslim immigrants and Italians converts to Islam within the Italian branch of an Egyptian-Sudanese Sufi brotherhood, in Rome.

As a confirmation that culture may lead to uncountable misunderstandings (or a series of miscomprehensions between a migrant and his hosts in the country of destination, in a case study), the Italian brethren foreground intellectual engagement with texts and scriptures over ritual performance and the role of the body, elements to which immigrants instead give prominence. The author suggests that such polarization and the reasons of its persistence may be best understood by focusing on the performative role of cultural essentialisms against immigrants and of stereotypes concerning the definition of ‘orthodox’ Islam circulating in Italy and beyond. The author argues that two different forms of knowledge, one intellectual, the other practical have a role to play in these phenomena that generate subject positions and relations of authority.

The e-journal also contains a Book & Report Review section, by Sara Hassan and Alberto Mazzali, CeSPI, Rome. This section covers many recent publications across the whole field of migration studies: from the theoretical to the policy-focused and from the regional to the global. In this issue, new works published by academic experts, international organisations and practitioners are reviewed as clustered as referred to both international migrations as a global issue (on migration and development nexus, distress migration and protracted crisis, migration within the SDGs framework, migration and rural-urban relations, and migration’s perceptions) and the regional level.

A regular article by Mahmoud K. El-Jafari aims at investigating the determinants behind the Palestinian households willingness and ability to pay bills for water and electricity services.

The author uses primary data, which were gathered on household expenditures and consumption of water and electricity in the West Bank, to investigate the determinants of household decision to pay for consumption of public utilities. Through the application of an econometric model to analyze the personal, economic, social and legislative variables as the major determinants behind households’ behavior toward payments of bills for the consumption of water and electricity.

Based on the results of data analysis, the author suggests that areas of cooperation, between providers of water and electricity on one hand and customers on the other hand, should be enhanced to improve the situation.

The article casts a critical eye over living conditions in Palestine, and that is what makes it very interesting.

The Palestinian society and economy have been struggling for years, due to the conflict with Israel – one of the strongest military in the world – and the

consequent closure policies the latter put in place, which restrict the movements of Palestinians.

Gaza and the West Bank (whereas East Jerusalem is still annexed by Israel) each undergo periodic cycles of collapse and recovery, usually driven by Israeli retaliatory measures for Palestinian attacks, reactions and invasions as well as international aid inflows.

Everyday life is dramatically affected by bloody armed conflict and violence, the Israeli military occupation, settlements and closures (including the "separation barrier" along and inside the West Bank border, checkpoints and roadblocks), structural dependence on international aid, acute fiscal crisis, huge unemployment and internal political tensions between and within Fatah (governing in Palestinian-administered areas of the West Bank), Hamas (in control of Gaza) and other groups such as the Salafi organizations in Gaza.

Population numbers clarify the unsustainable conditions of daily life after decades of instability, violence and occupation. The Palestinian population of 4.5 million have troubles in getting to their destinations: children have problems getting to school, parents to work, the sick and injured to hospitals, while between 420,000 and 470,000 Israeli settlers – encouraged by settlement expansion policy but illegal under international law (as reaffirmed by the UN Security Council resolution 2334, passed in December 2016) – live in the West Bank and these settlements complicate efforts for a two-state solution.

A final long article by Marco Zupi can be counted among the preliminary proposals aimed at offering a starting point to advance the beyond-GDP debate. In particular, there is an urgent need for a change of approach where the measurement of (sustainable) production and correlated productivity is concerned.

The article outlines the meaning and role of productivity, in terms of its definition and conceptualization, presents some debated points on the various components of productivity (labour, capital and total factor productivity) and underlines the importance of contextual conditions (political context, institutions, geography and market integration).

To go beyond the narrow GDP measurement should mean to rethink productivity as a measure of the developmental process of production. Development is conceived as a combination of quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the nested concept of sustainable development: economic growth, social development, environmental sustainability, conducive to political transformation. All that implies a critique extended to economic productivity as the very and narrow principle and process of translating inputs into outputs and results.

Some key questions are specifically presented and discussed with reference to agriculture and, adding usual caveat, general concluding remarks can be deducted from various measures as possible sources of inspiration on sustainable productivity.